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tection methods. In airborne detection, manned, and unmanned aircraft with a wide variety of sensors attempt to
identify minefields. Airborne detection has many advantages like it is safer than requiring soldiers to physically
locate and identify minefields using techniques such as
handheld mine detectors. Furthermore, the use of unmanned drones can further reduce the risk by eliminating
the need for pilots to fly over hostile territory. Sensors employing different modalities such as near infra-red (NIR)
and mid-wave infra-red (MWIR) can be used to identify
mines. Individual mine detectors are used to make decision
on presence and extent of the minefields. Airborne detection can also provide battlefield commanders with enough
advanced warning about minefield locations that they can
use to make decision about how they want to handle the
situation.

ABSTRACT
There has been significant recent interest in airborne reconnaissance for target detection using high resolution airborne images collected from an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV). Even if Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) algorithms are able to produce satisfactory results in terms of
probability of detection for certain false alarm rate, there is
a need for a Warfighter-in-the-Loop (WIL) to reduce false
alarms further and verify and validate detections to attain
the operational performance requirements. We develop a
simulation model to assess effectiveness of the warfighter
in decision loop for airborne minefield detection. The warfighter effectiveness is measured in terms of average waiting-time, number of minefield segments in queue, and the
expected false alarms, and missed detection. Various parameters which potentially affect the warfighter performance were identified with the help of prior studies with
human operator in laboratory settings. Simulation trials
were conducted to evaluate the dependence of these parameters on warfighter performance.
1

1.2 Minefield Detection Algorithms
Even though airborne detection seems to be a safer method
for detecting minefields, its efficiency depends on different
algorithms which will analyze the image data to detect individual mines and minefields. There are several algorithms which determine presence of mines and minefields
using visual features of the airborne image obtained from
the UAV (Reed and Yu 1990, Earp, Elkins, and Conrath
1995). Factors such as the thermal signature of the mine,
its shape, pattern, shadow are employed by algorithms to
determine whether a given feature is a mine. Mine detection methods often use an anomaly detector such as RX detector (Reed and Yu 1990, Homes, Schwartz, Seldin,
Wright, and Witter 1995) to detect possible mine locations.
Mine detection block may also use a false alarm mitigation
process to reduce the false alarm rate (Sriram, Agarwal and
Mitchell 2002). Even though algorithms are improving,
fully automatic target recognition process still fails to satisfy the operational requirements of minefield detection.
This necessitates human interaction for verification and
decision making.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Airborne Minefield Detection
The process of determining the existence of mines in a particular region is typically a manual process involving
handheld devices. Clearly, such an approach puts the human at elevated risk. The personnel are exposed to enemy
forces and also to undetected mines. On the other hand, the
human intelligence required to determine the presence or
absence of mines in an area of interest, cannot be completely automated. In order to mitigate these risks, mine
detection process is transforming into a semi-automated
stand-off detection system such as airborne minefield detection with warfighter in the loop.
Airborne detection has the advantage of being safer
and potentially more efficient than traditional minefield de-
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1.3 Role of Warfighter in Minefield Detection

2.2 Simulation Framework

The warfighter plays an extremely important role in airborne detection. He/she must make rapid decisions about
the existence of minefields sometimes under highly stressful conditions. However, we have relatively little understanding of how warfighters perform in minefield detection, what techniques they use to identify the presence or
absence of a minefield, and what interface features best
support their detection capabilities. Several tests were conducted using a MATLAB-based graphical user interface
for mine level as well as for minefield level detection
(Reddy, Agarwal, Hall, Brown, and Woodard 2005 and
Agarwal, Reddy, Hall, Brown, and Woodard 2005) to
study some of these factors.
The experiment used airborne data collected at two
different test sites of the US Army. Both military and nonmilitary personnel were used in the experiments. The purpose of these experiments was to analyze a warfighter's
performance when a set of images are presented at a constant rate. In real time situations, the warfighter might have
to handle images from not just a single UAV, but from
multiple streams of data from different fields, and may in
fact be multi-tasking. Moreover, the mental stress of the
warfighter should also be considered. This paper discusses
some of the observations from the above mentioned experiments and discusses a simulation model that is used to
analyze the system performance (here, the system is defined as the ATR and the human personnel combined) under varying conditions such as arrival rates and processing
times. The results obtained from the simulation analysis
can be used for specifying the performance metrics for the
individual components in the minefield detection system.

The factors such as the arrival rates, number of streams of
data, modeling of processing time, and the false-positive,
and false-negative rates associated with the ATR (automated algorithm), and the warfighter are discussed in the
context of performance characterization. The simulation
model will help identify the best operating conditions for
the semi-automated system, with specific focus on the average waiting time for the data segments in the queues associated with the warfighter.

2

3

PERFORMANCE MODELING

The basic model with a single stream of data is given in
Figure 1. The raw image data was collected from airborne
sensor flying through a particular area. In this simulation,
the following data were used: flight speed is 70 knots and
with a frame rate of approximately 8 Hz. The swath width
for the sensor is about 15 meters. In this model, the raw
imagery of registered minefield size segment typically representing approximately 60m x 120m on ground is processed by ATR for mine level detections. ATR uses algorithms such as RX (Reed and Yu 1990), and Radial
Anomaly Detector (Menon, Agarwal, Ganju, and Swonger
2004). Individual mine targets in the minefield size segment are further analyzed for patterns of potential minefield using minefield algorithms (Earp, Elkins, and Conrath
1995). Both ATRs are considered as a single component in
the current simulation. The required probability of detection of ATR at the minefield level is 95% with a false
alarm rate of less than 0.5FA/km2 The minefield segments
flagged by the ATR are passed to the warfighter for final
verification and decision making. The probability of detection at the WIL level is expected to be 95% with a false
alarm rate of less than 0.1 FA/km2.

PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH
OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of this paper is to identify performance drivers for a warfighter in a semi-automated minefield
detection system, where the warfighter acts as the second
decision maker to an automated minefield detection algorithm(s).

Inter-arrival Time

Raw Image
Data
Sequence

2.1 Objectives
The motivating problem for this research is the need to
characterize system performance in scenarios with data
streams from multiple UAVs, fed to a single warfighter-inthe-loop. In order to accomplish that task, it is critical to
understand the system behavior when only a single stream
is considered. This paper addresses this modeling need for
the domain, and will enable developing analytical models
for single data stream and multiple data stream scenarios.
Such a modeling effort will help in specifying and characterizing the system components appropriately.

ATR

Frame Processing Time
(Weibull Distribution)

Warfighter
in the
Loop

Frame rate
Swath width
Flight speed

Minefield PD and
2
FAR (FA/km )
Field Segment

Minefield PD
and FAR
2
(FA/km )

8 Hz
60 meter
70 knots

95% PD @
2
<0.5 FA/km
2
120x60m

95% PD @
2
<0.1 FA/km

Minefield
decisions

Figure 1: Mine Detection Model for Data from a Single
UAV
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Time taken by the subjects to make decision was considered at the WIL stage. The false-positive (flagging a
segment known to be mine-free as a minefield), and falsenegative rates of humans were also studied. In this study,
mental stress and other physical conditions such as climate
were not controlled or modeled.

3.3 Warfighter’s Time Response Characteristic
For the tests conducted on 10 subjects, the analysis was
performed by splitting the data into minefield segments
and non-minefield segments. The time taken to select the
corresponding segment was recorded for each user. Distribution of time taken by the users for segments with mines
and segments without mines was evaluated. Figure 2 and
Figure 3 shows the distribution for segments with mines
and segment without mines respectively. These results
show that users typically need more time to analyze segments which have actual mines in it than non-mine segments.
The scale, shape, and offset parameters of the Weibull
distributions were used to model the processing time in the
simulation model. A random variable X has a Weibull distribution if there are values of parameters such as, shape: c(
>0), scale: α( >0), and time delay: ξ0 such that:

3.1 Automatic Target Recognition System
The image segments are passed into the ATR in the order
in which they are received from the UAV at a rate of approximately 1/3 Hz. For our analysis, we have a groundtruth database which has the information whether the segment is a minefield or a non-minefield. Several algorithms
have been developed to detect mines based on their image
features. Different characteristics of the mines, such as circularity, and gray moments were used to detect anomalies.
These anomalies detected by ATR do not necessarily have
to be mines. It could be rocks or bushes having similar signatures. These are mine-level false alarms. The ATR’s decision, whether the analyzed segment is a minefield or not,
depends on the concentration and distribution of anomalies
in the segment. If the threshold level is reached, the ATR
flags it as a minefield segment. Non-mine targets flagged
as mines can sometimes form spatial distribution pattern
that is minefield like. The non-minefield segments that are
flagged by the ATR are called minefield false alarms. Only
a certain small fraction of the total non-minefield segments
are passed by ATR as false alarms. Only segments which
are flagged as minefields by the ATR are passed on to the
warfighter for further visual analysis.

c
⎛ X −ξ ⎞
0
⎜
⎟
Y=
,y>0
⎜ α ⎟
⎝
⎠

(1)

The probability density function of the random variable X is given as:

c
⎛ x − ξ0 ⎞
⎜
⎟
−
⎜ α ⎟
c
⎠ , x > ξ (2)
p ( x) =
x −ξ e ⎝
X
0
0
c
α

(

3.2 Warfighter Performance

)

The observed values and the fitted distributions are
shown in Figure 2 (for segments with mines; scale =
27.6378, shape = 1.3838, time delay = 5) and Figure 3 (for
no mine segments; scale = 16.2908, shape = 0.9916, time
delay = 3). These observed and modeled time distribution
in Figure 2 and 3 suggest that a Weibull distribution can be
used to model the time-response characteristic of the warfighter.

Some preliminary analysis was done to evaluate warfighter’s performance for minefield detection using airborne imagery. The experiments and results are described
in greater detail in (Reddy, Agarwal, Hall, Brown, and
Woodard 2005) and (Agarwal, Reddy, Hall, Brown, and
Woodard 2005). A set of 26 runs of images were selected
which covered a total area of 1.34 km2. ATR triggered 0.4
km2 as having high probability of containing minefields. In
order to facilitate the experiment, minefield segments were
chosen to form an even distribution of data from mine/nomine, time of day, and two different backgrounds. The
purpose of this evaluation was to characterize the human
processing time in minefield detection. The other factors
which are considered in this paper are the probability of
detection and false alarm rate of the warfighter. Some factors such as the mental and physical situation of the WIL in
an actual war, the other duty constraints are quite significant but are not considered here.

4

SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS

4.1 Simulation Framework and Controllable
Parameters
The problem can be well understood by the simulation
framework given in Figure 4. Figure 5 shows the flagging
of the frames which is explained later. The major components: ATR processing block, WIL processing block, and
the modeled factors associated with them are shown in the
figure, and are discussed in the following subsections.
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the input stage. For the current simulation, a constant
frame rate of 1 segment per 3 seconds is assumed. These
image segments are flagged as follows:

0.08
Minefield frames
Weibull - scale=27.6378, shape=1.3838, delay = 5
0.07

0.06

•
•

PDF

0.05

0.04

The image segment data has associated tags (Y/N) in
each frame which shows whether it is a minefield segment
or a non-minefield segment. These flagged images are
passed into the ATR for detection. The ATR does not have
any prior information regarding the presence or absence of
a minefield in any given segment.
The proportion of minefield/non-minefield is also an
important controllable factor that can be varied for analysis. The percentage of non-minefield segments would typically be much greater than the minefield segments. The last
controllable factor is the number of streams that can be
given as input. The warfighter can only handle a certain
number of segments since he/she takes time to evaluate
each segment. So analysis can be done to determine the optimum number of streams a warfighter can handle. This issue is considered beyond the scope of this paper, but will
be studied in the future as a continuation of the work discussed here.

0.03

0.02

0.01

0

0

20

40

60
Mean Response Time

80
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Figure 2: Processing Time for Segments With Mines
0.12
Non-Minefield frames
Weibull - scale=16.2908, shape=0.9916, delay = 3

0.1

0.08

PDF

Y : For minefield
N : For non-minefield

0.06

0.04

0.02

4.1.2 ATR Stage
0

0
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Mean Response Time
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There are three controllable parameters in the ATR stage.
They are the ATR processing time, ATR false alarm rate,
and the ATR probability of detection. The ATR takes a
definite processing time to analyze the segments. We expect a near real time automatic target processing and thus
the average time for ATR processing should be less than
the frame arrival interval. The probability of detection and
the false alarm rate of the ATR represents the efficiency of
the algorithm implemented for correctly detecting minefields and wrongly detecting non-minefields.

Figure 3: Processing Time for Segments Without Mines
4.1.1 Input Stage
There are three controllable parameters in the input stage:
the frame rate, proportion of minefield/no-minefield data,
and number of streams of UAV data. Image segments of
given size are acquired at some constant rate and is fed at

Frame Selection Time
(Weibull Distribution)

Input stage
Raw Image Data
with ground
truth information
• Number of streams
• Frame rate
• Proportion of minefield/nonminefields

ATR stage

WIL stage
Warfighter
In the
Loop

Automatic
Target Recognition
System
• Processing time distribution
• False positive rate
• False negative rate

• Processing time distribution
• False positive rate
• False negative rate

Figure 4: Simulation Framework with Controllable Parameters
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ATR False(Frame Recorded)

Y_ _
N_ _

WIL False(Frame Recorded)

YN_
YY_

YYN
YYY
NYN
NYY

NY_
NN_
ATR True(Correct Frames)

Correct
Frames

WIL True(Frame Recorded)

Figure 5: Frame Flagging at Each Stage
N depending on whether the frame is minefield or nonminefield respectively. These two are separately analyzed
at the ATR stage.
The decision at the ATR is ‘b’ which can also be a Y or
N depending on the accuracy of the ATR in selecting the
segment as minefield or non minefield. If ATR flags a minefield segment as a non minefield segment (YN) it would not
be passed into the next stage. This is an error, so this is one
factor which has to be considered for analysis. If the minefield segment is correctly flagged it is marked (YY) and is
passed to the WIL stage. If a non minefield segment is correctly flagged (NN), it is rejected because we do not need
correctly detected non-minefield segments to be passed to
the WIL. But if it is wrongly flagged as a minefield segment
(NY), it is passed onto the warfighter for further analysis.
This condition is a false alarm by the ATR, but since it is detected as a minefield it has to be passed to the WIL stage.
The segments arriving at the warfighter are: correctly
flagged minefields (YY), and wrongly flagged nonminefields (NY). There are four different possibilities at
this stage. The warfighter can correctly flag the minefield
segments (YYY) or he/she can make an error by choosing
a minefield to be a non minefield (YYN). Since the latter is
an error it is recorded for analysis. Similarly, if the warfighter flags the non-minefield wrongly (NYY) this segment is recorded since it is an error. The correctly flagged
non-minefield segments are (NYN).
Therefore we have three error values that are recorded
for analysis, the wrongly flagged ATR minefield segments
(YN), wrongly flagged WIL minefield segments (YYN),
and wrongly flagged WIL non minefield segments (NYY).

4.1.3 WIL Stage
The three controllable factors are: the WIL processing
time, WIL probability of detection, and the WIL false
alarm rate. The warfighter is presented with those segments which were tagged as mined by the ATR. This includes minefield segments and false alarms (Figure 5).
The time analysis which is covered in Section 2.2.3
shows how much time the user takes to analyze segments
with no mines and those with mines. This has been used to
determine the distribution of the processing time, which is
modeled as Weibull distributions as discussed in Section
2.2.3. The other factors evaluated at the WIL stage, the
probability of detection, and probability of false alarms,
represents the effectiveness of individual warfighter in correctly detecting minefields or wrongly identifying nonminefields as minefields.
4.2 Frame Flagging at Each Stage
The variables can be defined as shown in the Figure 6.
Frame Definition(a, b, c)
a – Ground truth; binary(Y/N)
a bc
b – Decision by ATR; binary(Y/N)
c – Decision by warfighter; binary(Y/N)
A “Y” indicates a minefield while “N” indicates a nonminefield at corresponding stage.
Figure 6: Frame Definition for Flagging the Frames.

5

Ground truth is the a prior known correct information
whether the segment is minefield or not. In real analysis,
we do not have this information. But for our analysis, we
have to assign different probabilities of selection for both
minefield and non-minefield segments. So ‘a’ can be Y or

DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS

A simulation model in Arena® of Rockwell Automation
(Kelton, Sadowski, and Sturrock 2003) was created to
study the performance of the modeled system.
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The third distribution used was a Poisson distribution
with a mean value of 3. This was also done to study the
queue formed at the WIL with the influence of the ATR.
The second parameter considered was the percentage of
minefield segments passed by the ATR. The objective requirement for probability of detection at ATR is 0.95. The
rest 5% minefield segments are rejected as missed detections. This factor is kept fixed with single level.
The third parameter is the percentage of non-minefield
segments which are passed by the ATR. The objective requirement calls for 0.5 false alarms per km2 which would
correspond to a probability of false alarms at approximately 0.5%. For analysis we are considering 3 levels of
selection rates. The probabilities chosen are 0.005, 0.015,
and 0.025 of non-minefields being passed as minefield segments. These segments are actual false alarms detected by
the ATR.

5.1 Controllable Factors and Levels Considered
Section 3.1 discusses several factors that are considered.
The simulation parameters that were used in each section is
explained in detail in the following subsections.
5.1.1 Input Stage
The frame arrival rate and also the proportion of the minefield/no-minefield segments are the two parameters which
were considered for the actual simulation. Multiple streams
were not considered since it was beyond the scope of this
paper. Table 1. shows the factors chosen:
Table 1: Parameters at Input Stage.
Frame rate
1/3Hz
Probability of Mine
0.005 0.010 0.020
segments

0.050

5.1.3 WIL Stage

Each segment from a single UAV was passed to an
ATR at a constant rate of one segment per 3sec which is
1200 segments/hr. For analysis, we are assuming that there
is no overlapping of segments. A number of segments were
passed for the total simulation with multiple replications.
The other parameter which is considered is the proportion of the minefield/non-minefield segments passed into
the ATR. We have no information of the actual percentage
of minefield/non-minefield segments coming from a UAV.
But we know that only very small percentage of segments
will have mines in a large area covered by the UAV. Four
levels were considered here, 5% of minefield segments
which means 20 minefield segments per hour, 2% which is
8 minefield segments/hr, 1% which is 4 minefield segments/hr and 0.5% which is 2 minefield segments/hr.

At the WIL stage, three parameters are considered as in the
case of ATR stage. They are: processing time at WIL, percentage of minefields passed, and percentage of nonminefields passed. This is illustrated in Table 3.
As discussed in Section 2.3.4, minefields and nonminefields are analyzed separately with two different
Weibull distributions. The analysis done in Section 2.3.4
considers only an area of 50x20m, but the actual area would
be 120x60m. Hence it is assumed that the user takes more
time in deciding on the actual area. In order to account for
this mismatch between the prior experimental and the proposed operational environment, the scale parameter, and delay of the modeled Weibull distribution are magnified with a
factor of 2 and 4 as shown in Table 3. These two levels of
factors are called Fac 2 and Fac 4 levels.

5.1.2 ATR Stage

Table 3: Parameters at the WIL

Three parameters are considered in this stage. They are the
processing time at the ATR, percentage of minefield segments passed, and percentage of non-minefield segments
passed. The parameters and levels are shown in Table 2. In
the simulation, ATR processing time is sub-divided into 3
levels. A constant value of 3 sec processing time was used
to analyze the actual wait time at the warfighter stage irrespective of the queue caused at the ATR stage. Since the
frame is also arriving at a constant rate of 3 sec, no queue
is formed at the ATR stage. The second distribution used
was a uniform distribution with a maximum value of 4 and
a minimum value of 2. This distribution would better approximate the behavior of the ATR as the processing time.

Detection
Time
(Weibull
Distribution)
PD@WIL
FPA@WIL

Minefield
Scale
Shape
Delay

Fac 2
55.28
1.38
10.00

Fac 4
110.55
1.38
20.00
0.95
0.20

NonMinefield
Fac 2 Fac 4
32.58 65.16
0.99
0.99
6.00 12.00

The second parameter is the probability of detection of
WIL. The objective requirement at WIL stage requires a
probability of detection of 95%. Laboratory experiments
with test images show a 100% probability of detection for
minefield by human operator (Reddy, Agarwal, Hall,
Brown, and Woodard 2005). For this reason only one level
is considered here at a PD of 0.95.
Similarly, for the third parameter, the objective requirements for WIL is to reduce the false alarms by a fac-

Table 2: Parameters at the ATR Stage
ATR processConstant
Uniform
Poisson
ing time
(3)
(2,4)
(3)
PD @ ATR
0.95
PFA @ ATR
0.005
0.015
0.025
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tor of 5, which means that only one in every five ATR
false alarm segments is called a false alarm by WIL, which
gives a probability of false alarm at WIL at 0.2. Here again
we consider only one level for analysis.

expected number of minefield segments which was
wrongly detected by the ATR is represented by :

5.2 Trials

where,
• YNATR is the expected number of wrongly detected ATR segments.
• X is the number of segments passed.
• PMF is the probability of minefield segments
• PMDATR is the probability of detection of minefield
segments at ATR.

YN

As discussed above the number of parameters and levels
that were used are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4: Calculation of Number of Replications for Simulation
Parameter
Levels DOF
Frame rate
1
Proportion of Minefield segments
4
3
ATR processing time
3
2
Probability of false detection at ATR
3
2
Probability of detection at ATR
1
Detection Time for WIL
2
1
Probability of false detection at WIL
1
Probability of detection at WIL
1
72

YYN
= X ⋅P
⋅P
⋅ (1 − P
)
WIL
MF MDATR
MDWIL
where,
•

12

(3)

(4)

YYNWIL is the expected number wrongly detected
minefield segments.
PMDWIL is the probability of detection of minefield
segments at WIL

And finally the expected value of the non minefield
segments which are wrongly selected by the human can be
represented by:

The number of replications is determined by the degree of freedom (DOF) from the levels of each parameter
as shown in Table 4. The factorial of the degrees of freedom of the parameters gives the total number of replications. So 72 trials were run with 12 replications to obtain
reasonable results. The replication length was chosen to be
28800 which represents 8 hours worth of data.
6

= X ⋅P
⋅ (1 − P
)
MF
MDATR

The expected value of minefield segments rejected by
WIL can be represented by:

•
Total Trials & Replications

ATR

NYY
= X ⋅ (1 − P
) ⋅ (1 − P
) ⋅ (1 − P
)
WIL
MF
NMDATR
NMDWIL
(5)
where,

•

OBSERVATIONS

•

A chi-square test indicated that that using different distributions (Constant, Uniform, and Poisson) for modeling the
processing time at ATR stage did not have any significant
influence on the waiting time for segments in the queue at
the human stage. This is expected since the average ATR
processing time in each of the three levels considered is 3
seconds which is same as the segment arrival time. For this
reason this factor is not discussed further in the paper..
The error count for segments at three different stages
is calculated. The wrongly detected minefield segments at
the ATR stage, wrongly detected minefield segments at the
WIL stage, and wrongly detected no-minefield segments at
the WIL stage. The count values were noted for each of 72
runs. Some of the runs are listed in the Table 5. Value of
different levels, average waiting time, and average frame
waiting at WIL stage are also shown. Table 5 also shows
the parameters and the corresponding error counts at the
ATR and WIL stage. The expected value of the error count
can be calculated using the corresponding equations. The

•

NYYWIL is the expected number of wrongly detected non-minefield segments(false alarms).
PNMDATR is the probability of detection of nonminefield segments at ATR.
PNMDWIL is the probability of correct detection of
non-minefield segments at WIL.

From the above equations and the trials, the expected
values of the counter was calculated and is shown in Table
6. X is taken to be 9200 segments for every replication.
PNMDWIL is taken as 0.80, PMDATR is taken as 0.95, and
PMDWIL is taken as 0.95 in every case as discussed in Section 4.1.3. The expected and observed counter numbers
were determined for each treatment. This was plotted
against the runs in Figures 7-9. Figure 7 shows the counter
value variation at the ATR stage where minefields are rejected by the ATR. The blue line shows the expected
counter values at each runs and the red line shows the observed counter values. Deviations from the expected value
were calculated statistically and the mean value of the deviation of the total number of counters was found to be
only 0.13, which is an acceptable range. Figures 7-9 also
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Table 5: Error Counts at Certain Runs in the Simulation; Poisson Distribution was Chosen as ATR
Processing Time
Prop
of
MF

PD
NM
ATR

Time
Factor
WIL

0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005

0.995
0.995
0.975
0.975
0.995
0.995
0.985
0.985
0.995
0.995
0.985
0.985

2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4
2
4

Counter
YNATR

Counter
YYNWIL

Counter
NYYWIL

Counter
total

21.17
23.00
22.17
24.57
4.42
5.00
3.75
5.25
2.33
1.42
2.25
2.33

22.08
9.83
17.83
9.42
4.33
3.17
4.25
4.08
2.42
1.92
2.92
2.67

9.33
4.33
33.75
16.92
10.25
9.58
47.58
43.67
8.92
10.25
47.50
46.08

52.58
37.17
73.75
50.83
19.00
17.75
55.58
53.00
13.67
13.58
52.67
51.08

Wait
Time
WIL

Number
Waiting
WIL

827.94
7561.38
3064.52
9087.52
13.20
66.86
39.22
1426.04
8.15
32.17
25.19
234.11

14.40
128.99
73.10
212.56
0.06
0.33
0.46
16.46
0.03
0.10
0.25
2.32

Counter YYNwil

Table 6: Expected Error(Counter) Values at Different
Stages
PNMDATR YNATR YYNWIL NYYWIL
PMF
0.05
0.995
8.74
23.00
21.85
0.05
0.975
43.70
0.01
0.995
9.11
4.60
4.37
0.01
0.975
45.54
0.005
0.995
9.15
2.30
2.19
0.005
0.975
45.77

25
Expected value
Observed value

20

Counter value

15

10

5

shows us that the deviations are in the acceptable range. A
higher difference is observed in the case of the high probabilities of minefields, and high false alarm rate by ATR
since there is a significant waiting time at WIL stage which
reduces the throughput. Hence deviation is higher for the
case of WIL processing time corresponding to factor 4.
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Figure 8: YYNWIL Counter Value Deviations
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Figure 9: NNYWIL Counter Value Deviations

80

Since the WIL waiting time was statistically independent of the ATR processing time, a better estimate of
the parameters at the WIL stage can be obtained by averaging the time values of all the three distributions. Figures

Figure 7: YNATR Counter Value Deviations
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10-13 shows the average waiting time and number of segments in the queue in a color scale, blue color being the
minimum waiting time and the red color being the maximum waiting time. The value of average waiting time and
number of frame waiting is plotted in logarithmic scale and
is represented using the color bar by the side of the plot.
The Figures 10-11 shows the value of average time when
there is x% of minefields in ground-truth and there is y%
of false alarm for non-minefield segments at ATR. In Figure 10-11, WIL decision time corresponds to factor 2 and
factor 4 respectively. Similarly Figure 12-13 shows the results for number of segments waiting at WIL stage. Here
also, Figure 12-13 show waiting times corresponding to
time factor 2 and factor 4 respectively.
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Figure 12: Color Map of Average Number of Segments
Waiting at Warfighter with a Time Factor of 2.
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Figure 10: Color Map of Average Waiting Time at Warfighter with a Time Factor of 2.
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False alarm rate for Non-Minefield frames at ATR
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Figure 13: Color Map of Average Number of Segments
Waiting at Warfighter with a Time Factor of 4.
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Based on Figures 10-13 several inferences can be made
on the selection of appropriate parameters at different stages
of the model. The best case can be identified as the lower
left corner in the plot where the waiting time and number of
segments in queue is small (<100seconds and <1 frame).
In this case, we have only 0.5% of minefield segments
in the whole set of ground truth which corresponds to
about 6 minefield segments/hr of which 95% are passed to
the warfighter. Also only 0.5% of non-minefields are
passed to WIL representing 6 segments per hour. Thus the
user needs to process only 12 segments per hour and thus
has sufficient time to process. This total is the least number
of segments that could come to the warfighter in a run.
Similarly the worst case scenario would be when we have
5% of minefield segments which is 60 minefield segments/hr and 2.5% of the non-minefield segments which is
approximately 30 non-minefield segments/hr. This is too
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Figure 11: Color Map of Average Waiting Time at Warfighter with a Time Factor of 4.
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many for the warfighter to keep up with the frame rate. So
the effective load on him increases and number of segments waiting at the queue at WIL will be larger(>200) as
observed in Figure 13. Since there are more minefield
segments in this case, there will be more detections at the
ATR and the human will have to analyze more minefield
segments which is more time consuming than nonminefield segments. Based on these results, in the case of
single UAV, we can observe that acceptable waiting times
are observed when the percentage of minefield segments in
ground-truth is less than 1% and also when the false alarm
rate for non-minefield segments is less than 1.5%. We can
also see from Figure 12 and Figure 13 that the warfighter
will be unable to handle the number of segments arriving
when values are beyond the above mentioned limits resulting in a long queue and long waiting time.
7

CONCLUSION

Airborne minefield detection model was studied using a
simulation model to evaluate the performance of a warfighter in the loop. Weibull distribution was considered
with appropriate scale, shape, and offset values for minefield segments and non minefield segments was determined for this model. After the parameters were determined, a simulation study was performed. From the results,
the effects of other blocks over the WIL were analyzed,
and shown. It was observed that with the model, time characteristics of the warfighter could be effectively studied. It
was found that the warfighters would not be able to handle
the number of segments to process effectively when the
percentage of minefield segments in ground truth is more
than 1% and when the false alarm rate for non-minefield
segments is more than 1.5%. This has significant implications on how to specify these systems for implementation.
Future studies will focus on the presence of multiple
streams of data from different sources.
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